To what extent is the government’s unhesitant support of faith schools compatible with democracy?

Faith schools present an interesting challenge to society as considerations of law and human rights mandate that these schools be allowed to operate as a manifestation of a religious right. However on the other hand one has unwavering claims of social segregation that develops as a result of these schools. The complaint is that communities are being segregated on sectarian lines which create the potential for the fostering of mistrust and hostilities within communities.[1] Essentially, the continued use of faith schools in society sets a dangerous precedent for inherent discrimination and a rejection of other faiths and associated cultures by educating the youth along sectarian lines. Despite the potential societal problem associated with faith schools, there is also a precarious projection of discriminatory practices in admissions and employment in these schools which directly discriminates on the grounds of religion, as well as indirect discrimination against members of society associated with the ethos that is allegedly contrary to the religious groups’ beliefs. One can therefore see that there are problematic elements associated with faith schools in law and societal norms. Historically, faith schools originated from the support given to schools by churches and resulting from this was a strong association of that school with the particular faith of that church. These schools currently exist as public schools which have a measure of government funding, as well as academies and private institutions.
Constructs of democracy vary, however the common sentiment of these theoretical constructs identify the central tenet of democracy as being an arrangement which allows decision making for the common good by people elected by the majority to do so.[2] This is referred to by Dworkin as the Majoritarian premise, which emphasizes the idea that decisions should be taken by the majority or a plurality of citizens.[3] The extent to which faith schools are compatible with democracy depends on how this common good is constructed. To state this simply, the Majoritarian premise is based on the idea that the majority favours or would favour the decision with all the relevant information available and understood thereby. It stands to reason that in order to determine if these schools are compatible with democracy that these schools are for the common good or are favourable in terms of the needs of the majority.

Legal Context of Faith Schools
The legitimacy of faith schools within society from a legal perspective is important to understand in order to determine the compatibility of these schools with a construct of democracy. The present status of faith schools stems from the Education Act 1944 which afforded faith schools a certain degree of autonomy within the education system, provided that the church authorities contributed financially to their schools.[4] In the years since the promulgation of this Act, the role of the church in society has declined significantly, with a simultaneous introduction of a variety of faiths in society and increasing secularism being broadly embraced. With the introduction of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, a measure of equality was given to religious minorities in the schooling system ensuring that faith schools now operated across a broader range of religious denominations.
Despite the roots of faith schools in the legislative provisions of the U.K, faiths schools also recently enjoy status under international human rights conventions and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which ensures religious freedoms.[5] This right contained in the HRA ensures that the individual has the right to manifest his religion and arguably, faith schools form a part of this manifestation. A limitation of this right is allowed where “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”[6] It stands to reason therefore, by virtue of a simplistic analogy, that the disallowance of faith schools would only occur if it is necessary in a democratic society. This brings relevance to the current discussion which considers the construct of democracy, albeit briefly and superficially in light of the extent of the issues regarding the matter. An example of a restriction on the manifestation of this right is seen in R v Secretary of State[7] where the House of Lords refused an application to allow corporal punishment in a faith school as a manifestation of the Article 9 right as it infringed on the purposes of child protection legislation, as it was found to be contrary to the best interests of the child.
Arguably therefore, faith schools are a manifestation of this right to religion under the HRA, as well as drawing legitimacy from the Education Act. As these schools do not operate under an unlawful purpose and are not contrary to the interests of public safety, public order, health or morals, or any other rights and freedoms, they do not merit abolition in the eyes of the law. It is well-known however, that law, morality and justice are distinct concepts and therefore the compatibility of these schools with the legal system does not necessarily mean that it is compatible with philosophical constructs of democracy.
The Construct of Democracy
The construct of democracy that is being used as a means of analysis is that which identifies the common good or favour of the majority as being central to the process of democracy. Schumpter defines this as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.”[8] Whilst Dworkin couches the construct similarly, yet in different terms as the majoritarian premise which “is a thesis about the fair outcomes of the political process: it insists that political procedures should be designed so that, at least on important matters, the decision that is reached is the decision that the majority or plurality of citizens favour.”[9] Although these definitions are framed differently in terms, essentially they are based on a similar premise of decisions by the people, for the people. The question however to be determined with regards to this premise, is how the common good is determined. This becomes more problematic with the recent emphasis of the importance of human rights within this political framework as arguably these are diametrically opposed to the idea of democracy, as they ensure the protection of minorities within a country, despite the public opinion or opinion of the majority.[10]
One can argue that Dworkin’s definition of the majoritarian premise takes account of this as the decisions made by the majority are those which would be favoured “if it had adequate information and enough time for reflection,”[11] although Schumpter argues that collective logic will never be unified despite any number of logical argument proposed for the acceptance thereof. Accordingly, Dworkin rejects the idea that the majoritarian premise requires that the community defer to the majorities view on how individual rights are to be respected and enforced. In doing so, it majoritarian premise presupposes that the concept of majority rule is always unfair where the majority are allowed to dictate the collective rights of their community. Schumpter notes this difficulty similarly by stating that there is no uniquely determined common good as invariably people will always want different things.[12] The progression therefore is that perhaps the needs of democracy demands that a majoritarian approach be taken to the construction of the government, however that a constitutional conception of decision making be adopted rather than one of majority rule. This constitutional conception is where collective decisions are made to treat all citizens with equal respect and concern, with this conception declared to be the essence of democracy rather than a cause of moral regret, i.e. that the majority does not dictate the decision making according to the needs of the majority exclusively. Accordingly, both Schumpter and Dworkin recognize the inherent problems within classical conceptions of democracy as being one that recognizes a foundational principle of majority rule and in doing so, democracy introduces an element of political morality. One can argue that the introduction of human rights into mainstream jurisprudence is a codified and measurable statement of these political morals. The compatibility of faith schools with democracy therefore is one which must be consistent with the common good taking into consideration ideals of political morality. Arguably therefore, the consistency of faith schools with democracy is one which must ensure legitimacy of these institutions within the legal framework of the country taking into considerations the fundamental rights and freedoms that it is designed to protect.
Compatibility of Faith Schools with Democracy
Based on these constructs of democracy it is clear that compatibility therewith is not a simple inquiry into the religious opinions of the majority, but whether the continued existence and support of these schools is one which is in the common good taking into consideration individual rights based on ideas of political morality which justifiably limit the exercise of majority rule. This proceeds from the assumption that the majority is opposed to faith schools and the practices associated therewith.
There are a number of arguments made against the continued practice of faith schools, not least of which because they promote discriminatory practices with regards to admissions, employment and certain religious practices. Contrary to Human Rights legislation, as well as the Race Relations Act 1976 discrimination on the basis of religion alone can merit exclusion from the school. Employees and potential employees of these schools are also exempted from protections against discrimination as provided for by relevant legislation.[13] In these cases, employees may be dismissed from or rejected by the faith school if they are not of the same beliefs as the school or that their conduct is incompatible with the ethos of the school. If one considers the highly exclusionary nature inherent in religious institutions this presents obvious indirect discriminatory practices against groups such as racial minorities, religious minorities, homosexuals and divorced adults. With the obvious complaint made that these schools perpetuate discriminatory practices in society, a number of issues of political morality or human rights become evident. The first of these considers the use of these schools as a manifestation of the right to religion contained in Article 9 and considers whether the discriminatory practices inherent in these faith schools and the prevailing social concerns based on segregation are sufficient to allow the limitation of the right, by either abolition of these practices, i.e. to eliminate discriminatory admissions and employment policies within these school, or to abolish these schools themselves. This then raises the next issue, which asks whether exclusive practices of these schools are inherent to the exercise of this right where the abolition of these schools or the discriminatory practices associated therewith will unreasonably or unjustifiably limit the exercise of the Article 9 right. Essentially, these are two sides of the same coin and as a result one can see that there is a need for a balancing act between these rights in order to determine the compatibility with democracy as considering both the individual right and the common good.
Based on development of the egalitarian jurisprudence, the prohibition against discrimination is contained in Article 14 of the HRA. Whilst discrimination on religious grounds is a form of direct discrimination and therefore unlawful in the eyes of the law,[14] the application of the HRA does not extend to faith schools. Arguably, this lacks legitimacy in the law as there is no fundamental basis as to why faith schools are exempted as there has been no proven statement of public good served by these schools. Recently, the court has an opportunity to address the matter of faith schools with regards to discrimination, however carefully neglected to do so.[15] The case of R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [16] perhaps provides some insight into the rationale of faith schools from a standpoint of political morality where the court ruled that the right to religion was absolute, however the right to manifest that religion was qualified and therefore capable of limitation. In this case, a fundamental element of the ratio revolved around the rights of other female students in the school rather than the manifestation of a single childs beliefs. Therefore, instead of viewing the political morality from the perspective of the persons discriminated against by these schools, one can adopt an approach of protecting the rights of those within the schools themselves. This implies that faith schools are protectionist of Article 9 rights, rather than exclusionary in terms of Article 14. This in itself correlates with the constructs of Schumpter and Dworkin’s conceptions of democracy as being those that concern and enforce individual rights equally and therefore are protectionist of individual and minority rights. Whilst potential students and employees of these schools may be excluded, their ability to join other schools is not infringed and therefore any right that may be infringed is particular to a specific faith school itself. Comparatively, the detrimental effect on students of faith schools who are denied educational instruction according to their religious beliefs is greater and as a manifestation of a religious right, education in religious instruction is considered highly important.
It is clear that the construct of democracy according to the popular understanding thereof as being majority rule is a flawed political doctrine. To this extent, both Schumpter and Dworkin acknowledge the shortcomings thereof. Whilst Schumpter merely acknowledges these difficulties, Dworkin presents these challenges with a form of philosophical alternative thereto in the form of the inclusion of morality in the majoritarian premise. Although essentially this disproves the value of the majoritarian premise itself, the constitutional conception of democracy is one that is foundationally constructed on this premise and which acknowledges the inherent flaws therein. Morality in law is always a problematic construct, however recently with the emphasis on human rights in U.K legislation and common law, it has been argued that these are a unilateral statement of political morality within the country based on internationally accepted conventions on human rights. The compatibility of faith schools with democracy as a result depends largely on the compatibility of these schools with political morality, and therefore with human rights. The overwhelming consideration in determining the answer to this question is to determine whether these schools are necessary in protecting and enforcing the individual’s rights and in light of human rights jurisprudence, whether these are necessary to the extent that they justify discrimination that results from the operation of these schools. By analysis of this context, it is clear that democracy does not demand that the opinion of the majority dictate the existence of these schools, but rather in recognizing that democracy demands that the common good be established. To this extent, the common good recognizes that these schools are a necessary extension of the right to manifest ones religion and the detriment to these individuals or groups of individuals outweighs the potentially infringed rights of other members of society. In light of this analysis therefore, it is clear that despite social objections to faith schools, the existence and support thereof is compatible with the philosophical construct of democracy.
Primary Sources
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Education Act 1944
Education and Inspections Act 2006
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 Human Rights Act 1998
Race Relations Act 1976
School Standards and Framework Act 1998
Case Law
E (Appellant) v (1) JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15
R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15
(on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment UKHL 15 [2005] 2 A.C. 246
The British Humanist Association & Others v London Borough of Richmond upon Thames & Others [2012] EWHC 3622
Secondary Sources
ATL (2007) Position Statement: Faith Schools [online] Available on: [Accessed 21 December 2012]
Dworkin, R. (1996) Freedom’s Law: the Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press
Nickel, J. (2010) Human Rights. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online] Available on: [Accessed 21 December 2012]
Lawyers Secular Society (2012) Faith Schools [online] Available on: [Accessed 21 December 2012]
Schumpter, J. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin


Prospects of Democracy

Unfortunately, these moronic, ungrateful, stone-age Jerk-offs either refuse that generous gift out of arrogance or are too stupid to put it together correctly (It’s not like It’s an Kea dresser, folks). Is the developing world hopeless, or are the efforts of developed countries? Has democracy simply run its course among those who are capable of handling It? What developed countries could democracy work or not work In? Regardless of the answer to those questions, which I will address, the people of any given nation have to want democracy. The U.
S has been a leader in trying to sit on the chest of developing countries trying to spoon-feed this lattice medication to them, but even when it goes in their mouth, the spit it back out the moment they stand back up. For the sake of humor though, I’ll juxtapose the U. S as a successful democracy against that of other countries in its history for the first part of my essay. The second of potential and current democracies in the modern world, and last, whether and how much democracy I believe there will be in the next 20 to 25 years and solutions to achieve it.
Get ready to hop on the Magic School Bus not to the Prehistoric era or inside a human body, but… To the land of democracy? Sorry, Ms. Frizzle got sent to rehab by some marc who found LSI under the driver’s seat. Suffice to say this ride won’t be as fun as past “adventures”, but I’m going to give It a damned good try. Now let’s take a trip back to 1783 in the great land we’ve just come to know as the united States of America. For the first time, it appears as though democracy truly has a shot.

The British actually surrendered to the American revolutionaries and those who remained in opposition exiled themselves! Talk about a clean break! As most now in modern times, this is not the usual case in revolutions. Even the supposedly peace-loving and wimpy French were chopping off heads in the name of democracy. There’s always the Greeks right? Sadly, the esteemed Athenian democracy met its ends through the violence and civil war it had allowed to fester throughout it’s reign.
However, America Is deferent – not simply due to apple pale and barbecue – but like most great achievements, due to impeccable timing. Had what’s now known as the united States been colonized centuries prior when Europe was still trudging through the Feudal Ages, democracy would almost certainly falter, especially In an emerging nation. And regardless of the ascribed poverty of our country’s childhood, most of the influence, and at worst, they were of a middle-merchant class.
In addition, they were also working with an Eden of resources and real estate. As the Proof. Said and I paraphrase, “they would have to be pretty stupid to mess this up. ” Furthermore, this was post-renaissance and ideas like democracy and morally-rich thought had been being nurtured for a good portion of time. And one of the more important aspect was that while the colonists were poor, they had an entire ocean to separate their ‘oppressors’!. Back to the point of comparing the U. S with other countries past and present, the U.
S has not yet proven either its ability to wield democracy successfully nor whether democracy is even a successful form of government. “Hell to the no, wiener-brain”, I can already hear you shouting, but I implore your to consider this quote from Alexander Tyler, a Scottish history professor at the University of Edinburgh, “A democracy is always temporary in nature; it simply cannot exist as a permanent form of government. A democracy will continue to exist up until the time that voters discover they can vote themselves generous gifts from the public treasury.
From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates who promise the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that every democracy will finally collapse due to loose fiscal policy, which is always followed by a dictatorship. ” This was said in 1787 and while is hasn’t come to fruition in the United States, it has certainly done so in many other upstart democracies. Hearkening upon my early statement about the U. S. ‘s success, I pose two questions to gauge the democracy’s success. What is the best kind of democracy? The U.
S has a representative democracy hat is actually more akin to a republic (the latter being an especially deft blow to its potential claim of success). How can a government’s ability to conquer an entire form of policy be Judged on one particular? How much time must pass before a democracy is to be deemed a success or not? The U. S is going on 250 years, not much greater than Greece (in more strict democratic terms), well beneath the Roman Republic which peaked around 500 years, and vastly short of the longest-living globally successful civilizations in history.
For the sake of argument however, let us assume that the U. S is indeed all that ND a bag of Chests (why would you choose plain chips when there are so many better options? ) and that it will survive until Jesus flies down and raptures all of its citizens up to heaven for being so loyal (except the gays and Democrats). Despite all of its political prowess and embodiment of benevolence, America cannot be a role model to most countries because its situation differs far too much from other countries.
Two countries may have the same recipe for chocolate chip cookies, but if the U. S has butter and Ghana only has butter-substitute spread, guess what – you’re not goanna end up with chocolate chip cookies. To start, as I said in the previous paragraph, America had what few countries have had or will ever have: a blank canvass and the brushes to paint onto it. When the pilgrims escaped the despotic rule of the English, despite their difference, they shared far more in common.
As the American Revolution was waged and goals were made in the aftermath, common interest on the macro level was still abundant. In contrast, “The countries of the bottom billion are, for the most part, the opposite of America. Rapidly put together in nation…. The now-successful states were built through a painfully slow and circuitous recess of formation that turned them into nations with which their citizens identified. This enabled them to undertake the collective action that is vital for the provision of public goods.
Most modern states were once ethnically diverse. The boundaries of a modern state generally emerged not out of deepening bonds forged out of a primordial ethnic solidarity but as the solution to the central security issue of what size of territory was best suited to the creation of a monopoly over the means of violence” (Collier, 2009). This lends a crucial similarity to the U. S and developing countries: violence. Not even a century into its lifep, the United States was already destroying itself – not quite the idyllic picture modern citizens paint for it.
Even the political process that had brought the U. S to that point relied on conflict: “The evolution of the modern state was, on this analysis, violence driven. Step by step, the predatory ruler of the mint-state had evolved into the desperate-to-please, service-promising, modern vote- seeking politician. ” (Collier, 2009). Throughout the 19th century the U. S political system potentially gave a voice and ammunition to any self-centered megalomaniac ho may have planned to use the system to satisfy his and his friends’ appetite for profit.
The electoral process of the early U. S was rife with corruption with politicians bribing for vote and boxing out undesirables from the polling booths (e. G. Blacks, anyone who disagrees). This is hardly the system most would want to see implemented in developing countries even if the eventual outcome is a successful system like the U. S enjoys now. Kenya is currently considered by many to be the most successful democracy about developing nations. Sadly, this is like saying it is the prettiest turn in the toilet.
Lash out if you will, but I say this to emphatically point out that Kenya is a part of a larger failing system and its successes are simply not great enough to warrant any sort of complacency. And when the U. S is considered hypothetically as a marker one needs to consider its current ten percent unemployment level and major election corruption as recent as 2000 in the Bush/Gore presidential race (or perhaps 2008 if one feels the need to consider the black panther incident to be on the same scale), it is quickly realized that the bar needs to be raised for all, not simply developing worlds.
In order for democracy to truly take root in developing nations first-world intervention cannot be reduced to the parental platitude of “do as I say, not as I do”. Nations such as Kenya or Zambia are not stupid or naive children and don’t want to be ordered to follow democratic dictations when their administrators renege on their promises and police themselves as they see fit (lending yet more credence to the 01′ Spider-man adage, “with great power comes great responsibility’). However, a nation such as Kenya is in role of leadership itself amidst the other African developing democracies and is thus expected to up its ante as well.
Unfortunately the lack of democracy almost always brings with it the lack of accountability in the public and media arena too. Kenya was no exception given that “The structure of the Kenya media system appears to result in many media outlets turning in to direct political instruments in election campaigns, during which politicians use ethnicity to win votes. ” (Hollander, 2010). How can the public make sound political choices when one, information from the television or literature?
The situation doesn’t look to be improving for developing countries elsewhere on the globe either. Further north – but not too distant in Africa – another prime democratic hopeful Morocco shares its breather’s woes. “Morocco has the longest record of multi-party elections – 1963 on. Yet whenever the king risked losing, the king dissolved the assembly and changed the rules. ” and “Most of these countries have held elections at least occasionally, but all too often these have been fake elections orchestrated by the government in favor of one party. ” (Étagère, 2003).
This paints a rather bleak picture for democracy in developing countries given that Kenya is supposed to be a hallmark of hope: if they cannot achieve it, who can? It appears that a trend, rather a disease, has a Dearth Evader death-grip on the societies’ political ambitions. Democracy is often spoken of the most ideal and viable alternative to warfare as the combatants can fight within the arena of politics rather than the battlefield, however most hopeful leaders have taken that maxim to the extreme. Rather than shoulder the burden of leadership for the greater good of Justice and their people’s welfare, “… N actual practice , in many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the process of democracy is marked by bitter animosity and quarrel between the efferent political parties , giving an impression as if these countries are in constant turmoil all the time with one group trying to defeat another group to seize power. ” (Sir Lankan Guardian, 2010). In turn, these elections become mere contests where politicians become intoxicated in the thrill of the fight and seek only to serve their or their family’s needs in a twisted marriage of their own ego. Each political group in its anxiety to defeat the other often even go to the extent of maintaining thugs and rowdies in their groups to indulge in violence, settle scores with the opponents, indulge in malpractices in election including bribing the voters etc. Due to this approach, the law and order machinery virtually collapses. ” (Sir Lankan Guardian, 2010) While this is true for many politicians in any country, it’s especially devastating to a country like Sir Lankan, who don’t even have a sound enough political system or successful economical infrastructure to absorb the shock of those mistakes.
This kind of arrogance leads to a destitution where the populace is virtually selling itself into slavery to the government. The governments of developing countries or hat Paul Collier calls pejoratively “the bottom billion” are blind to the tremendous cost of their foolish attempt to shield themselves from cooperation with their neighbors. “The paradox is that despite having the most to gain from pooling their sovereignty, the societies of the bottom billion have pooled it the least. ” (Collier, 2009).
Many of these countries operate under a facade of democracy and subject their citizens to authoritarian rule such as despotism that “… May take the form of a “beggars’ democracy,” where people talk at will, in groups even, but can never expect to change anything. ” (Kaplan, 1996). In Latin America, one author tells how the authoritarian regimes had become so severe they should actually be viewed as a benchmark for necessary studies on democracy that scholars often ignore: “These lessons… Were learned through the bitter experiences of democratic breakdown and repressive, bureaucratic-authoritarian rule (p. 2), a claim that echoes throughout the ramifications of the violence that birthed almost every major nation in the world that I spoke of earlier, and the cause of the violence itself: ethnic identity. The idea that ethnicity is both the cause of nationalistic violence and the obstacle tanning in the way of a successful democracy is something certainly doesn’t sit well with most and may end up actually inciting violence! As I stated before, America had the advantage of being forced to deal with diversity whereas most nations have a firmly rooted cultural society, complete with enemies and collective taboos.
America’s economy was also firmly tied to its cultural identity which is important because “When the pace of expansion gets sufficiently far ahead of the process of building a common identity, the resulting superstars face overwhelming problems in trying to establish a common identity. Instead of becoming nations, by default they become empires. ” (Collier, 2009). A common identity was forged through the “state” part of the United States where the states could pursue their own interest to some degree, but were ultimately held up the to law and standard of a central government.
Even China – commonly viewed as purely an authoritarian government – has only been successful politically and economically when they unified under the emperor Kin Shih Hunting and more recently under the communist party. This illustrates a very basic and click principle of “two are stronger than one”, but is one many developing entries refuse to accept due largely to self-serving interests. This conundrum is likely most prevalent in the Middle-East and Africa where basically the same cultural wars have been waged since ancient times.
Given the relatively most economically severe nature of the latter coupled with the proportionally greatest amount of aid sent there, the stakes are the highest. “The evidence from recent surveys of attitudes across nine African countries by Aftermarket is not encouraging. It is found that if people are educated they are more likely to identify themselves through their ethnicity. “So development, with the attendant education, Jobs, and electoral competition, is increasing the salience of ethnic diversity rather than erasing it. ” (Collier, 2009).
So despite overall improvement of these developing countries, democracy still faces a disturbingly poor outlook. Despite any inclination so far to the contrary, capitalism is still necessary for a country to facilitate democracy regardless of any ethnic ties that will remain. It will lift the economic tide of the given country, and more importantly give collective identity through the society’s pursuit of better financial welfare. As it stands, African evolving countries are far from self-sufficient let alone ripe for producing democracy. The resulting reduced need to tax has been reinforced by aid: in the typical country of the bottom billion the government gets around a third of its expenditure needs met by aid… The current Uganda president Missives has deviated from his previous tyrannical leaders in that he realizes that in order to have a strong army one must must have a strong economy. ” (Collier, 2009). Coupled with American’s instant society, capitalism raised the income of the average citizen throughout the country’s history and prevented any one entity from ruling the entry or forcing its hand political (with a few exceptions of course).
When the economy is healthy enough to support a widespread computer access in developing countries,”The use of Sits (Information and Communication Technologies) can lead to accountability’ in democratic elections. (Modern Democracy, 2010). However, neoclassical capitalism will not suit the country seeking democracy, especially given their ethnic circumstances; regulation is necessary to ensure that the market doesn’t become corrupt or unstable as is the case with so many African countries (and notably the United States in the recent financial crisis).
As for the argument that regulation stifles innovation, Stilling cited former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Blocker, who said: ‘it’s hard to find any evidence from anybody who’s not in the industry that can show any clear link between the so-called financial innovations and increased productivity in our economy. ‘”(CNN, 2010). Here the relationship between ethnic identity and capitalism becomes even more important: the population of a developing country must not think simply for themselves, but for what they believe is the betterment of their country as a whole given that “… Racket is not one individual; Robinson Crusoe does not make for much of an economy. ” (Smith, 2010). So given capitalism and ethnic identity, we now have two strong ingredients for the recipe of democracy, but how do we make developing countries go by the recipe? Any tactful parent knows the best kind of method to get your kid to do what you want is through incentives or misleading rather than direct positive punishment. In this line of thinking I propose two solutions – one that I’ve up with myself and one I am borrowing from one of my sources.
The first is a leader of a leader or group of adders coming together using the old adage of “an enemy of my enemy is my friend” in that larger groups paint each other as the devil and consolidate their political sovereignty in Africa into two to three larger states. The leader(s) hopefully will understand this strategy is merely for political purposes and in turn practice enough restraint to prevent the whole from barring all contact with each other. The would eliminate much of the ethnic conflict by saying “look how much we have in common given that these people don’t truly understand our collective struggles. This is no bout at least a mite idealistic as managing ethnic conflicts that have lasted for centuries through a one of the biggest escapades of charm the world has ever known would be a task not suited for the current political leaders of developing countries. The second strategy is one the author Paul Collier suggests is positive reinforcement in the form of international military intervention – not the kind that’s most thought of though. In developing countries governments, especially newly formed ones, the first thing they fear is military upheaval or coups De teat so what is it that they’d want most – the prevention of them.
Basically what he proposes is that the international community lay out a list of rules for democracy that a given country has to follow and in return they will protect them from any sort of military coup. To support his theory, Collier goes through a test “game tree” where all the possible scenarios that could occur in response to this proposal would all end up in at least one or some the countries agreeing to this proposal. The latter would take place because nobody wants to be the only ones on the chopping block by themselves.
Furthermore, Collier suggests that “coups need to be harnessed, not eliminated” (Collier, 2009). The international community can then guide countries into democracies through protection and support of viable leaders who want to see the process through. Requires meticulous manipulation and time, while the latter basically is forcing democracy through non-democratic means. Unfortunately, response to this criticism comes down to saying, Mimi got a better idea? ” Within a time frame of 20-25 years, I believe democracy is certainly achievable – through means such as the ones I suggest or variations of it otherwise.
Following the end of the Cold War, the developed worlds made almost all the mistakes possible in the handling of evolving countries: they either intervened too much militarily or not enough (Rwanda). Another strategy, bridled with or instead of the former, would be centered around ramping up the amount of aid that developing countries are so heavily reliant on in exchange for a structured system on how it is spent. Further-along democracies such as Thailand or India could benefit from these programs as well.
Plus, as these maturing democracies develop, they will be given more say and weight when dealing with international matters – a kind of recognition they likely feel is long overdue. Much of the Western world needs to stop treating these countries like they are simply children (or at least don’t let them think that you are). The Democracy that Americans enjoy is an exception, not the standard. Many of the protections economic standards that Westerners employ need to be disbanded to support global financial growth and in turn, a more healthy domestic economy.
Compassion and self-interest need not be enemies, however, helping developing countries make the feasible transition to democracy requires a genuine altruism that’s not often seen in political endeavors. Being that I’m no economic or political expert, I almost feel that writing this paper is pointless outside of a grade because managing this subject successfully is something that requires an entire career, but in a message that needs to be transmitted to the entire developed world: we need to start somewhere.


Role of Youth in Democracy

Facing a world in a vertiginous transformation, the social and personal construction in East Timor is indispensable. In a process of transformation that will lead East Timor to peace and tranquility and eventually to a true democratic country, a country that really belongs to all the Timorese people, depends mostly on the participation of the Timorese people itself, especially the youths, to rebuild the country from the total devastation.Participation is the noblest action of exercising democracy. Participation means taking part in decision making to build the future and making decision means having responsibility to whatever the risk as the outcome of those decisions. To make all these become real, there might those in power grant opportunities. The achievement of new spaces of political and cultural participation of youths, through their juvenile organizations, should play, in this context, a decisive role.
These existing organizations should free themselves from any influence or interests (politically, ideologically, or any religious believe) in other to maintain as important social and cultural movements, which take the conscious responsibility for pushing the process of changing and society building. The timorese youths are fighting for gaining a new space of political and cultural participation. In their National Congress, the youths presented a number of alternatives for the solution of some fundamental questions for the future of East Timor. Alternative such as the official language for East Timor is one of the examples.This is a clear indication that the timorese youths are responsible for their own future that the youths denied to be put aside for believing that the future belongs to the youth. The structural changes will not be possible with passive agents neither with the disruption movements. The latter even endanger the development of democracy.
The social and cultural evolution of modern societies produce effects over the life and behavior of the East Timor’s youths organizations demanding them to be more dynamic and able to give adequate answer to the evolution of mechanism of participation and dialogue with the governments or those in power.The models of participation, demanded by the modern societies, will impose the youths’ organizations new forms of exercising the partaking democracy. A partaking democracy can only be possible in East Timor if the youths and all the timorese people, whatever their age, should always be young to work for the construction of their future, to take part in this great job and accept this mission of constructing a free East Timor: an East Timor for the happiness of all.The main protagonist of the accelerate process of social transformation lived in this threshold of the third millennium is that the youths now have more opportunities and other privileged means in relation to other previous generations to consolidate the values of democracy and have more spaces of participation or in possessing more ability of taking initiatives. Nevertheless, the youths’ participation must be done in political level, in the level of decision-making process.The more the political participation of youths, the bigger will be their responsibility and will be easier to be mobilized to participate in finding solutions for the whole problem of the country. If taking decision is viewed as a choice, then this choice must be based on responsibility.

If democracy is more than a way of life, then there only be reason for living in democracy when it is chosen: and the choice can only be rational when the alternatives are known and is based on relevant characteristic of the way of choice


What Does Democracy Signifies

If firms were not in a competitive environment, they would be able to control the market. Still, there are other factors, which stop firms from controlling the market. Namely the fact that firms do not have perfect information, issues about its objectives or firms may not even know how to maximise profits. This is due to the fact that companies use different pieces of information or interpret it differently.
Firms can use different tasks in order to achieve the same aim. Companies often set themselves in mission statement; or they try to set goals by which the statement will be achieved; or a specific objective.
A firm aims to maximise profits, and that is what this essay will focus on. First, it will give a brief definition of firm and define its objectives. Second, it will examine the assumption of profit maximisation. Third it will confirm whether firms really maximise their profits. Then it will follow by mentioning other alternatives to profit maximisation. Finally in the conclusion, it will include the results of this essay.

It is understood by firm ‘ an organisation consisting of one or more individuals working as a decision-making unit to produce goods or services” (Atkinson, B. & R. Miller “Business Economics”). The firm”s objectives are to maximise profits.
The amount that the company receives for the sale of its output is called its total revenue. The amount that the firm pays to buy inputs is called its total cost. We, then, define profit as a firm”s total revenue minus its total cost.
Thus, if a firm gets £10,000 from selling its output and spends £90,000 producing this output, its profit is £10,000.
The above diagram shows how costs, revenue and profit interact with each other. Costs go up with output as well as revenue, but just till a certain point. Revenue falls due to the firm”s necessity to lower its costs in order to rise selling. In other words, in the cost curve firms will experience increasing returns, followed by decreased returns.
Revenue will rise, as price falls and quantity goes up. Profits will occur between the two points were the curves intersect. The slope of the two curves are the same and they are given by the marginal value (marginal revenue and marginal cost). Hence, to maximise profit, marginal revenue must equals marginal cost. In order to achieve this, firms must have all the details on the demanded product.
Profit maximisation plays an important role within a firm, as it makes innovation possible as well as the payment of higher wages and greater job offers. Moreover, profits create incentives as it is rewarding for entrepreneurs, whose time and skills contributed to the firm”s success. Increasing profits leads to a rise in output and with it consumers also get more satisfied. Thus, it can be said that it is also beneficial to society to raise profits. Profits provide a source of revenue, which reverts in favour of new factories and machinery. In addition, profits encourage innovation again society benefits from it.
However, there are still motives for companies to refuse to have high levels of profit. Companies will just be able to maximise profits if owners are in control of the firms. However, in big companies such as Coca-Cola or Shell where, probably, there are many shareholders, it is more difficult to maximise profits. As, in this case managers are more likely to run the business. This leads us to do so called ‘principal-agent problem”. Where owners” objectives may be different from the managers. Hence, due to the rise of the joint-stock company there has developed a split between ownership and control.
Ownership belongs now to shareholders, while managers exerce the power of controling. Still, there are motives to choose to maximise profits. Firstly, profit maximisation is still a sign of power, so in a competitive environment firms will opt to maximise profit to ensure its survival; Secondly, both the principal and agent, when confroting a situation of no option, they would prefer to maximise profits rather than lower them; Most important, due to profit maximisation it became possible for economists to study the output and the price of companies and, consequently, study the market.
In analysing the managerial approach, it can be noticed that managers will then aim to take precedents over the objectives of the owner. In this case the primary goal of a firm is to maximise its revenue. This will occur because managers” remuneration is more likely to be linked to revenue than to profitability. For example, bank”s tend to regard growing sales positive as well as financial markets, who likes to see growing sales revenue. Most important, sales revenue is still seen as an indication of success.
The same occurs to firms that have their main aim to maximise growth. Just like raising revenue, raising growth also leads to higher bonuses. Managers also benefit from it because their status gets better, as the firm has more prestige. Such theory, also suggests that managers try to maximise their own profit benefits. In other words, use firms to get their objectives.
Still, there is other theory that states that managers in fact do not maximise anything at all, but they attend to satisfactory levels, theory developed by H. Simon. Here, managers will set a minimum level of profit, keeping shareholders satisfied. This type of approach is probably used by small firms, which are not able to take the big risks that profit maximisation can lead to. Moreover, managers try to keep all members of the firm satisfied, so profit maximisation becames a hard task to achieve.
In general, conditions of uncertainty difficults the achievement of sales and profit maximisation. In practise management tries to obtain growth in output and assets from one year to the next and achieve satisfactory growth. On one hand, it is true to say that there is a separation of ownership and control, consequently, this stresses the importance of managers. On the other hand, it is difficult to describe how the different objectives of management and shareholders interact to produce the goals and objectives of the company.